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HOW TO ADMINISTER THE "BIG HURT" IN A
CRIMINAL CASE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 806
Fred Warren Bennett*
I. INTRODUCTION
"How can you impeach somebody that hasn't testified?," the defense
attorney wondered in a federal drug trial.' As this question suggests and
this article will demonstrate, the admission of hearsay testimony into evi-
dence from the mouth of an out-of-court declarant poses a significant
problem for the party against whom it is admitted: how to impeach the
out-of-court declarant who is not present to testify.
Cross-examination provides opposing counsel with the best way to test
a witness' credibility and truthfulness.' In fact, an essential purpose of
the Confrontation Clause is to allow the opportunity for cross-examina-
tion.3 Trial courts permit cross-examination not only to impeach the gen-
eral credibility of a witness, but also to "expose possible biases,
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly
to issues or personalities in the case at hand."' By exploring the partiality
of a witness, opposing counsel can discredit the witness and reduce the
weight of his testimony.
With cross-examination automatically available to attack an in-court
witness, fairness requires that an attorney be allowed to attack the credi-
bility of an absent hearsay declarant whose statement has been admitted
* B.A. (1963), American University; J.D. (1966), L.L.M. (1967), George Washington
University Law School. Mr. Bennett is an Associate Professor of Law at the Columbus
School of Law, the Catholic University of America, where he teaches Trial Practice, Evi-
dence, Criminal Law, and Criminal Procedure. Professor Bennett wishes to thank his re-
search assistant, Ms. Angela Lynn Hart, a third year law student at the Columbus School of
Law, The Catholic University of America, for her valuable assistance with this Article.
1. United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1473 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992).
2. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987) (recognizing that cross-examination
"is critical for ensuring the integrity of the factfinding process"); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 316 (1974) (noting that part of what makes cross-examination such an effective tool is
the ability of the attorney to impeach the witness); see Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the
Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 588 n.96 (1988).
3. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986).
4. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.
1135
Catholic University Law Review
against a party. Rule 806 of the Federal Rules of Evidence embodies this
fairness by providing attorneys with the ability to attack and support the
credibility of absent hearsay declarants.
5
This article explores the options available to both prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys under Rule 806. The article will examine the common
law antecedents to Rule 806, followed by a discussion of the rationale and
scope of the Federal Rule. The true heart of the article is the discussion
of the defense counsels' use of Rule 806 because the defense attorney can
best exploit the potential benefit of the rule. The section addressing de-
fense counsels' use of Rule 806 explores the use of the rule by examining
the nine modes of impeachment. The section on the prosecution's use of
Rule 806 considers the implications of the Constitution's Confrontation
Clause on both hearsay and on Rule 806 as used against criminal defend-
ants. The last three sections of the article discuss other uses of the rule:
its application to Federal Rule of Evidence 703, its use in supporting or
rehabilitating the credibility of declarants, and its use in examining hear-
say declarants on the witness stand.
II. COMMON LAW ANTECEDENTS OF FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 806
At common law, a hearsay statement admitted into evidence stood
"testimonially as the equivalent of a statement made on the stand and
subject to cross-examination.", 6 Thus, courts considered the declarant of
a hearsay statement a witness even though absent from the courtroom.
7
As such, the testimonial rules of qualification that applied to statements
made on the witness stand also applied to hearsay statements.8 Namely,
the declarant had to be a competent witness with personal knowledge of
the subject matter of the out-of-court statement.
Because hearsay statements admitted into evidence stood as the
equivalent of in-court testimony, it was also proper to subject those state-
ments to the same impeachment methods as an in-court statement.9 At
common law, courts admitted evidence of perception, memory, and nar-
ration to impeach the credibility of the declarant.' ° In addition, evidence
of a declarant's prior convictions was admissible to impeach his or her
5. FED. R. EVID. 806 (noting that a declarant's credibility can be attacked, and if
attacked, supported).





10. Id. § 989, at 921.
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credibility." The declarant's credibility was also impeachable by the ad-
mission of evidence of his or her bias in making the statement. 12 Like-
wise, courts admitted evidence of the declarant's interest in the subject
matter of the litigation for impeachment purposes.
13
The cross-examining attorney had yet another method of impeaching
hearsay declarants at common law. The attorney could introduce other
hearsay evidence to impeach previously admitted hearsay statements of
an absent witness.' 4 In response to opening the door to credibility at-
tacks, common law also provided for rehabilitation of an absent declarant
whose credibility had been attacked. 5
The Federal Rules of Evidence and common law both permit the im-
peachment of hearsay declarants.' 6 There is, however, one area of signif-
icant difference between common law and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
At common law, courts required an attorney to establish a proper foun-
dation before impeaching a declarant with a prior inconsistent state-
ment.' 7 Common law required that a cross-examiner give the declarant
an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistent statement before im-
peachment. 18 By contrast, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not require
the cross-examiner to establish a foundation before impeaching an absent
declarant with an inconsistent statement. 9 The discussion of inconsistent
statements under the provisions of Federal Rule 806 will further explore
this distinction between common law and the Federal Rules.2 °
11. Id. § 980, at 828 (noting that admissibility of the record of judgments is universally
accepted).
12. Id. § 948, at 783-84.
13. Id. § 966, at 812 (discussing evidence of the declarant's interest in civil litigation).
14. Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 3'5, 43 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating
that "hearsay evidence may be received to impeach previously-admitted hearsay state-
ments of an absent witness").
15. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1514, at 423.
16. See FED. R. EVID. ARTICLE VIII advisory committee's note (comparing the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence approach to hearsay with the common law approach).
17. 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 91
806[01], at 806-6 (1995).
18. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1025, at 1020 (noting that the witness should also be
asked whether he made the statement, thereby removing any surprise that the statement
will be used against the witness).
19. FED. R. EVID. 806. The Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledge explicitly that
Rule 806 "is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an
opportunity to deny or explain." Id.
20. See infra notes 128-56 and accompanying text (discussing the foundation require-
ments of evidence of inconsistent statements).
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III. THE RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 806
A. The Rationale of Federal Rule of Evidence 806
The theory that the absent declarant of an admitted hearsay statement
is a witness provides the basis for Federal Rule of Evidence 806.21 There-
fore, like an in-court witness, the trial court should allow a party to sub-
ject the hearsay declarant's credibility to impeachment and support as
though he or she testified in court.22 Federal Rule of Evidence 806
provides:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule
801(d)(2), (C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the
credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may
be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for
those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence
of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsis-
tent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any
requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an op-
portunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hear-
say statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness,
the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement
as if under cross-examination.23
One purpose of Rule 806 is to provide fairness for the party unable to
cross-examine the declarant of a hearsay statement.24 Rule 806 allows
the opposing party to impeach both the declarant and the hearsay state-
ment despite the declarant's absence from court. Thus, with the aid of
Rule 806, a party can use the permissible modes of impeachment and
rehabilitation under the Federal Rules of Evidence to impeach or rehabil-
itate the absent hearsay declarant.
25
B. The Scope of Rule 806
Rule 806 allows parties to impeach hearsay declarants when ordinarily
this would be impossible without calling the declarant to the stand. How-
ever, the rule also allows a party, in its case-in-chief, to call the declarant
21. FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note.
22. Id.
23. FED. R. EvID. 806.
24. People v. Ross, 154 Cal. Rptr. 783, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Kline, 464
N.E.2d 159, 163-64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
25. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 1[ 806[01], at 806-10 to 806-12 (Cumula-
tive Supp. 1995). Other permissible modes of impeachment include evidence of prior con-
victions, reputation, and prior inconsistent statements. Id. at 806-10.
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to the stand and question him as if under cross-examination.26 The party
does not have to wait for the proponent of the hearsay to call the declar-
ant or demonstrate that the declarant was a hostile witness.27 Obviously,
the ability to examine the declarant as if under cross-examination applies
only if the declarant is present at the trial o'r hearing, and the party is able
to call the declarant as a witness.
28
Because courts often admit hearsay when the declarant is unavailable
to testify in court, Rule 806 does not give a party the absolute right to
face-to-face cross-examination.29 However, even though Rule 806 and
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause are not perfectly conso-
nant, an example of Rule 806-Confrontation Clause harmony occurs
when the declarant is unavailable, and the court disallows cross-examina-
tion of a witness who is present and is testifying to the declarant's out-of-
court statement. The court would violate both the Confrontation Clause
and Rule 806 if such a situation is the defendant's only chance to impeach
the declarant.30
There are limits on Federal Rule of Evidence 806's applicability. The
rule applies only to impeach hearsay statements. If a court admits an out-
of-court statement into evidence that is not offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, Rule 806 does not apply because the statement is not
hearsay.31 Furthermore, Rule 806 does not apply to statements admitted
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) or (B); although it does
26. FED. R. EvID. 806; United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397 (1986) (recognizing
that Rule 806 allows a party to call the declarant and examine as if under cross-
examination).
27. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 397-98.
28. United States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 1987). In Paris, the declarant
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 397. The trial
court then excused the declarant from testifying. Id. at 398. Thus, the defendant was un-
able to cross-examine the declarant. Id. at 400.
29. Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 510 (3d Cir. 1985); see Paris, 827 F.2d at 400.
30. United States v. Bruton, 937 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1991). In Bruton, the trial
court refused to allow the defendants to impeach an informant who did not testify. Id at
327. The informant taped conversations with the defendants which the prosecution admit-
ted into evidence. Id. Because the tape included statements from the informant, the de-
fendants argued that the informant was a witness against them and they could impeach his
credibility. Id. The Seventh Circuit found no Confrontation Clause violation because the
unavailability of the declarant was never established. Id. at 329. The Seventh Circuit ex-
plained that the defendants could have asked for a subpoena or asked that the government
produce the declarant. Id.
31. United States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that Rule
806 does not apply if the statement is not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and
therefore is not hearsay). In order for a statement to be hearsay, it must be offered for the
truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EvID. 801(c); see People v. Ross, 154 Cal. Rptr. 783,
790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (commenting that no Sixth Amendment guarantees attach to
hearsay evidence not received for the truth of the matter asserted).
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apply to evidence admitted under 801(d)(2)(C), (D), and (E).32 State-
ments admitted under 801(d)(2)(A) or (B) are admissions of a party-op-
ponent, therefore, credibility of those statements is always subject to
attack.33
Another possible limitation of Rule 806 is whether a party can impeach
a hearsay declarant's out-of-court conduct with evidence of an inconsis-
tent statement or conduct by the absent declarant. The language of
Rule 806 does not indicate whether a party may impeach out-of-court
conduct which is admitted as hearsay evidence.34 However, if a court
admits out-of-court conduct of the declarant as hearsay, it is likely that
Rule 806 would allow impeachment of such evidence. This is true be-
cause the mention in Rule 806 of inconsistent conduct as impeachable
evidence would likely cover both a declarant's hearsay statement or his/
her conduct.35 Similarly, if the court admits the conduct of the declarant
as non-hearsay, nothing in Rule 806 prevents the opponent from arguing
that the conduct was an assertion of fact by the actor, and thus, trying to
impeach the actor pursuant to Rule 806.36 This would be a matter of
discretion for the trial court.
Other Federal Rules of Evidence limit the application of Rule 806.
There is no guarantee of admissibility under Rule 806; the rule specifi-
cally states that evidence used to impeach or rehabilitate a declarant must
be admissible in the same way as if the declarant had actually testified as
an in-court witness.37 The limits on impeachment and rehabilitation of
in-court witnesses, as prescribed by Article VI of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, apply equally to both the impeachment and rehabilitation of
absent hearsay declarants. 38 Additionally, the Federal Rules of Evidence
regarding relevancy limit Rule 806. Evidence admitted under Rule 806
32. FED. R. EvID. 806.
33. Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7069 n.28. Thus, a party does not need Rule
806 to impeach the declarant of 801(d)(2)(A) or (B) hearsay evidence.
34. See FED. R. EVID. 806 (showing the rule is silent with regard to out-of-court con-
duct of the declarant).
35. Id. When applicable, Rule 806 states a party can admit evidence of a statement or
conduct by the declarant which is inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement.
36. 4 DAVID LouISELL & CHRISTOPHER MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501, at
1255 (1980) [hereinafter LouISELL & MUELLER].
37. FED. R. EvID. 806; United States v. Finley, 934 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1991) (not-
ing that "Rule 806 does not allow the use of evidence made inadmissible by some other
Rule"); United States v. Mejia-Valez, 855 F. Supp. 607, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that
"[a] party is allowed no greater latitude in impeaching a hearsay declarant pursuant to
Rule 806, than the party would otherwise be permitted by the rules of evidence in im-
peaching a witness that testified at trial").
38. 4 LouISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1252-53.
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must be relevant to the hearsay statement that it is offered to impeach or
support.39 Finally, the probative value of the evidence offered under
Rule 806 must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or any
of the other considerations of Rule 403.40
IV. THE DEFENSE COUNSEL'S USE OF RULE 806: THE NINE MODES
OF IMPEACHMENT
Traditionally, a lawyer has nine methods to impeach a witness' credibil-
ity, whether the witness is testifying in court or is an out-of-court declar-
ant.41 The first four modes of impeachment concern the competence and
eligibility necessary to be a witness. 42 These modes of impeachment in-
clude: oath, perception, memory and recollection, and communication.
The last five modes are used to discredit the testimony of the witness.43
The last five modes consist of bias, prejudice, interest, motive, and cor-
ruption. This section will discuss each mode and its application under
Rule 806.
A. Oath and/or Affirmation
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 603, before testifying a witness must
swear an oath or affirm that he will testify truthfully.44 For most types of
hearsay the oath or affirmation requirement cannot be met because the
declarant is not an in-court witness. 41 The notable exception is former
39. FED. R. EVID. 402 (discussing requirements for relevant evidence); United States
v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 570 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Vaughn v.
Willis, 853 F.2d 1372, 1379 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing Rule 806 and the relevancy
requirement).
40. FED. R. EvID. 403. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.; see Vaughn, 853 F.2d at
1379 (applying Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to a Rule 806 impeachment).
41. Anthony M. Brannon, Successful Shadowboxing: The Art of Impeaching Hearsay
Declarants, 13 CAMPBELL L. REV. 157, 160 (1991).
42. Id.
43. Id. (noting that the last five modes do not seek to discredit the competency or
eligibility of the witness).
44. FED. R. EvID. 603. Rule 603 provides: "Before testifying, every witness shall be
required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation adminis-
tered in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind
with the duty to do so." See United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 1993)
(showing that the purpose of the oath is to impress upon the witness the importance of
being truthful); see also United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
that "there is no constitutionally or statutorily required form of oath"); Gordon v. Idaho,
778 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985) (indicating that a witness does not have to use the
words "swear" or "affirm" to satisfy the oath or affirmation requirement).
45. Brannon, supra note 41, at 160.
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testimony given under oath or affirmation and admitted under Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1).4 6 Obviously, if the court admits hearsay evi-
dence under Rule 804(b)(1), a defense attorney cannot impeach the hear-
say statement for not being made under oath. Thus, the concern of Rule
603 is with evidence admitted under another exception or under Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) (C),(D), or (E). The party against whom the
hearsay is admitted must deal with damaging testimony not given under
the penalty of perjury. During cross-examination of the in-court witness
and during summation, the party's attorney may argue to the trier of fact
that because the declarant did not make the hearsay statement under an
oath or affirmation of truthfulness, the trier of fact should consider the
statement untrustworthy and disregard it.
47
ILLUSTRATION ONE
IMPEACHMENT OF ABSENT HEARSAY DECLARANT AS TO
OATH/AFFIRMATION
Assume the defendant is on trial for a murder that took place inside a
state prison and the witness on the stand, an inmate of the prison, is testi-
fying to a coconspirator's statement made by John Doe. The statement
by John Doe implicates the defendant, but Doe has invoked the Fifth
Amendment and is unavailable to testify. Cross-examination proceeds as
follows:
Defense Attorney: "John Doe is your friend, correct?"
Witness: "Yes."
Defense Attorney: "And you know John Doe will not be a witness here
today, don't you?"
Witness: "That's what I hear."
Defense Attorney: "So John Doe will not be making any statements
under oath here today like you are, will he?"
Witness: "No."
Defense Attorney: "And when John Doe told you that my client was in-
volved in the murder he wasn't under oath then either was he?"
Witness: "No, he wasn't."
46. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Admission of hearsay under this rule is further condi-
tioned on whether the party against whom the hearsay is admitted, or, in a civil proceeding,
"a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the former
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." Id.
47. Brannon, supra note 41, at 160.
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B. Perception
Perception is the second mode of impeachment that challenges the wit-
ness' competence to testify.48 Federal Rule of Evidence 601 governs the
witness' competency to testify.49 The standard for admissibility under
Rule 601 is extremely liberal; competency is the rule, incompetency the
exception. 50 Factors that relate to competency are probative generally of
the weight and credibility of the testimony, rather than its admissibility.51
The witness' ability to perceive, therefore, goes normally to the weight
given to the testimony and is subject to impeachment by defense
counsel.
52
During cross-examination the defense attorney may question an in-
court witness as to the witness' ability to perceive the subject of his or her
testimony. The defense attorney utilizes this type of impeachment to di-
minish the weight and credibility of the testimony.53 Because the declar-
ant is considered a witness, defense counsel may also impeach the
perception of the hearsay declarant the same way as an in-court witness.54
An attorney does not have the opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay
declarant, therefore, the attorney may ask the witness who is testifying to
the statement, questions concerning the declarant's perception.5
The defense attorney may impeach the declarant's perception with
both extrinsic and intrinsic evidence.56 Extrinsic evidence is evidence
other than the responses given by the in-court witness.57 Courts allow
48. Id. at 160-61 (noting that perception basically deals with the witness' five senses).
49. FED. R. EvID. 601. Fed. R. Evid. 601 provides in part: "Every person is competent
to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."
50. See FED. R. EvID. 601 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee states
that "[tlhis general ground-clearing eliminates all grounds of incompetency not specifically
recognized in the succeeding rules of this Article." Id.
51. Id. (noting that competency goes to weight because "[a] witness wholly without
capacity is difficult to imagine").
52. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee's note (suggesting that only in
the rare case will lack of perception be a basis for exclusion of evidence). This would occur
only when a witness, or an out-of-court declarant did not see the event or transaction in
question and thus, lacks personal knowledge. FED. R. EvID. 602 (providing in part: "A
witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter").
53. FED. R. EvID. 602 (requiring the witness to have personal knowledge of the sub-
ject to testify).
54. FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note; see supra notes 6-8 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the fact that hearsay declarants are in essence, witnesses).
55. Brannon, supra note 41, at 161-62, (discussing State v. Howard, 337 S.E.2d 598,
601 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) as an example of this type of impeachment).
56. Id. (asserting that counsel is limited to the testimony of the witness when the mat-
ter is collateral, but may use extrinsic evidence when material facts are at issue).
57. Id.
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impeachment by extrinsic evidence when the matter of the testimony is
not collateral, namely that it relates to a material fact at issue in the litiga-
tion.58 A witness' in-court testimony about the hearsay declarant's per-
ception of the subject of the hearsay statement is material, and thus, may
be impeached by extrinsic evidence.59 For example, the defense attorney
may introduce evidence that the declarant had alcohol in his or her sys-
tem when the statement was made, and therefore argue that the alcohol
affected the declarant's perception.6" Counsel may also introduce evi-
dence that the declarant was under psychiatric care when the statement
was made.61 Allowing defense counsel to impeach the declarant's ability
to perceive may persuade the trier of fact that the hearsay testimony is
untrustworthy and should be discounted.
ILLUSTRATION TWO
IMPEACHING THE ABSENT HEARSAY DECLARANT AS TO
PERCEPTION
Assume the defendant is on trial for robbery and the main issue is the
accuracy of the defendant's identification as the perpetrator. The witness
for the prosecution testifies that ten minutes after the alleged robbery, an
absent hearsay declarant, John Jones, told him that he [John Jones] just
saw a man approximately 6' 2" and 235 pounds [the same general height
and weight of the defendant] fleeing the crime scene. The cross-examina-
tion of the witness proceeds as follows:
Defense Attorney: "You know John Jones well, don't you?"
Witness: "Yes."
Defense Attorney: "Isn't it a fact that Mr. Jones wears prescription eye-
glasses because he is almost legally blind?"
Witness: "Yes, that is true."
Defense Attorney: "And sir, Mr. Jones was not wearing his prescription
eyeglasses when he talked to you some ten minutes after the crime, was
he?"
Witness: "Come to think of it, you are correct. He had no glasses on
when I was talking to him."
58. Id. at 161.
59. Id. at 162.
60. United States v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (holding
that the amount of alcohol in the declarant's system goes to the weight of the statement not
its admissibility).
61. United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 684 n.44 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that this line
of questioning was entirely proper even though the prosecutor objected vehemently).
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C. Memory and Recollection
The third mode of impeaching a witness' competency to testify includes
the introduction of evidence pertaining to a witness' memory or recollec-
tion.62 The liberal standards of Rule 601 also govern the impeachment of
memory and recollection.63 Concerns about the witness' memory affect
the weight and credibility attributed to the witness.' The defense attor-
ney may also impeach the memory of an absent hearsay declarant be-
cause the declarant is considered a witness.65 The attorney may apply the
same principles of impeachment to memory and recollection that apply to
perception.66 The cross-examiner may ask the in-court witness testifying
to the hearsay statement questions about the declarant's ability to re-
member the matters surrounding the out-of-court statement.67 The hear-
say declarant's memory of the subject matter of the hearsay statement is
material; hence the cross-examiner may also introduce extrinsic evidence
that the declarant's memory is defective, and therefore, argue that the
jury should give the statement little weight.
ILLUSTRATION THREE
IMPEACHMENT OF ABSENT HEARSAY DECLARANT AS TO
MEMORY/RECOLLECTION
Assume the same fact scenario as in Illustration Two regarding percep-
tion, except that now, the conversation between the witness and John
Jones took place two weeks after the robbery. The same witness is on the
stand and cross-examination continues as follows:
Defense Attorney: "Now, when John Jones talked to you about the al-
leged robbery and what he saw, that was two weeks after the incident
correct?"
Witness: "Yes."
62. Brannon, supra note 41, at 162.
63. FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee's note; see supra notes 49-51 and accompa-
nying text (discussing requirements of Rule 601).
64. FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee's note.
65. FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note (asserting that the declarant should
be treated like a witness and subjected to impeachment); see supra notes 6-8 and accompa-
nying text (elaborating on the concept of treating the hearsay declarant as a witness).
66. Brannon, supra note 41, at 162.
67. Id. (stating that a hearsay declarant or witness is required to remember the events
surrounding the out-of-court statement).
1995] 1145
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Defense Attorney: "Isn't it a fact that Mr. Jones [the hearsay declarant]
couldn't even remember the day of the week or the time of the day when
he claimed he saw a man running from the scene of the robbery?"
Witness: "Yes, I'm afraid that is correct."
D. Communication
Impeachment of a witness' communication of his or her testimony is
the fourth and final mode of attacking the witness' competency to tes-
tify.68 The general rule of competency of Rule 601 also governs the wit-
ness' ability to communicate. 69 Rule 806 allows impeachment of the
hearsay declarant's ability to communicate.7" The attorney must assess
the declarant's ability to communicate through cross-examination of the
in-court witness and through the introduction of extrinsic evidence.71
Courts admit extrinsic evidence because the declarant's ability to commu-
nicate, as well as to perceive the substance of the out-of-court statement,
is material to facts at issue in the trial.72 The attorney may attempt to
establish that the statement attributed to the declarant is beyond the de-
clarant's intellectual capacity and that the declarant repeated only what
someone else had said.73 If the attorney is successful, the declarant's per-
sonal knowledge may be called into question, thereby diminishing the
weight and credibility of the hearsay or disqualifying the out-of-court de-
clarant as a witness.74
ILLUSTRATION FOUR
IMPEACHMENT OF ABSENT HEARSAY DECLARANT AS TO
COMMUNICATION
Assume the same factual scenario as outlined in Illustrations Two and
Three above. The cross-examination of the witness proceeds as follows:
68. Id. at 163.
69. FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee's note (explaining that the narration of a
witness is relevant to his credibility); see supra notes 49-51 (discussing this principle in
greater detail).
70. See FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note (implying that because a party
can impeach a witness' ability to communicate, a party can impeach the out-of-court de-
clarant in the same manner).
71. See Brannon, supra note 41, at 163-64 (discussing impeachment of the declarant's
ability to communicate).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 163.
74. FED. R. EVID. 602 (requiring a witness to have personal knowledge of the matter
in order to testify).
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Defense Attorney: "On direct examination, you testified that Mr. Jones
used the word 'egregious' in describing the conduct of the 6 foot 2 inch,
235 pound man he saw running from the scene of the robbery, correct?"
Witness: "That's correct."
Defense Attorney: "What does the word 'egregious' mean to you?"
Witness: "I have no idea what the word means."
Defense Attorney: "And you know, don't you, that Mr. Jones [the absent
hearsay declarant] dropped out of high school in the 9th grade, don't
you?"
Witness: "Yes, he did."
E. Bias, Prejudice, Interest, Motive, Corruption
Evidence of bias or interest is the first of the five modes of impeach-
ment used to discredit the testimony of the declarant by impeaching his
or her credibility.7" In Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence, no
specific rule includes evidence of bias or interest as a means of impeach-
ment.76 However, its wide acceptance and established use at common
law indicate that such evidence was implied in Article VI of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.77 In fact, the Advisory Committee's notes to Rules
608 and 610 include impeachment by evidence of bias or interest.78 Use
of extrinsic, as well as intrinsic, evidence is permitted for impeachment
purposes because evidence of bias directly affects the witness'
credibility.79
Because the Federal Rules of Evidence regard the hearsay declarant as
a witness,80 the cross-examiner may impeach the declarant's credibility
75. See Brannon, supra note 41, at 160, 164-65.
76. Id. at 164 (noting that bias is referred to in the advisory committee's note to Rules
608 and 610). In contrast, impeachment of a witness by showing bias or prejudice is specifi-
cally authorized in Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and 411.
77. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50-52 (1984) (holding that evidence of a de-
fense witness' membership in the same prison gang as the defendants was an appropriate
method of impeachment to demonstrate bias, despite the lack of a specific Federal Rule of
Evidence pertaining to impeachment by bias or interest); Brannon, supra note 41, at 164
(indicating that because impeachment by bias was so obvious and well known, it did not
have to be included in the Federal Rules of Evidence).
78. FED. R. EVID. 608, 610 advisory committee's note. It is perplexing, to say the least,
that impeachment of a witness by proof of bias or interest is not covered directly in the
Article VI rules, while impeachment by bias or prejudice is specifically authorized in Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 408 and 411. See supra note 76.
79. Abel, 469 U.S. at 51 (recognizing that courts have accepted extrinsic evidence to
show bias); Brannon, supra note 41, at 164 (explaining that because bias goes to credibility,
a material issue is raised and can therefore be attacked by both intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence).
80. FED. R. EvID. 806 advisory committee's note; see supra notes 6-8 and accompany-
ing text (recognizing the hearsay declarant is regarded as a witness).
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with evidence of bias, prejudice, interest, motive, and corruption.8 In so
doing, the cross-examiner wants to infer that bias or interest influenced
the declarant in making the statement, therefore, causing the jury to
question the declarant's credibility and the statement's veracity. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Lechoco,82 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit allowed the government attorney to
question a psychiatrist who had examined the defendant-declarant about
the defendant-declarant's motive to receive an acquittal.83 The court al-
lowed questions pertaining to the impact of the defendant-declarant's
motive on the truthfulness of his responses during the psychiatric
examination. 8'
In United States v. Check,8" the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recognized that evidence of bias or interest is a permissi-
ble mode of impeachment. 86 In Check, the appellate court permitted the
defense attorney to impeach the declarant's credibility with evidence of
the declarant's motive or interest in lying to a government agent.
87
When a cross-examiner impeaches a hearsay declarant with an out-of-
court statement indicating bias, prejudice, interest, motive, or corruption,
the absent declarant will not have an opportunity to explain or deny the
statement.8 8 Likewise, if the cross-examiner impeaches the hearsay de-
clarant with his out-of-court conduct indicating bias or interest, the ab-
sent declarant will not be afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the
conduct.89 To require that the impeaching party provide an opportunity
for the hearsay declarant to explain or deny the statement or conduct
would, in effect, deny the opportunity to impeach the absent hearsay de-
clarant, since there would be no witness declarant on the stand who made
the statement or engaged in the out-of-court conduct. This principle of
dispensing with any foundation requirement of confronting the witness
with his out-of-court statement or conduct accords with Rule 806 which
81. 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1246; see FED. R. EVID. 806
advisory committee's note.
82. 542 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
83. Id. at 86-87.
84. Id.
85. 582 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1978).
86. See id. at 684 & n.44.
87. Id. at 684 n.44 (stating that the declarant could have had a motive to lie to the
government agent because " 'he was facing a serious criminal charge in state court' " and
may have been trying to curry favor with the government).
88. State v. Phillips, 840 P.2d 666, 672 (Or. 1992) (holding that an out-of-court state-
ment by an absent declarant indicating bias is not subject to the familiar foundation re-
quirements of the state rules of evidence for bias impeachment of in-court witnesses); 4
LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1247.
89. Phillips, 840 P.2d at 672; 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1247.
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does not require that a party give the absent declarant an opportunity to
explain or deny an inconsistent statement before a court can admit evi-
dence to impeach the hearsay testimony.9"
ILLUSTRATION FIVE
IMPEACHMENT OF ABSENT HEARSAY DECLARANT AS TO
BIAS, MOTIVE, INTEREST, PREJUDICE
Assume the defendant is on trial for arson and that two weeks after the
fire, Ralph Smith, the absent hearsay declarant, told Detective Hart that
he, Ralph Smith, saw the defendant running from the scene five minutes
after the fire started. The cross-examination of Detective Smith proceeds
as follows:
Defense Attorney: "Officer Hart, you claimed on direct examination that
two weeks after the incident Ralph Smith told you that he saw my client
[the defendant] running from the scene of the fire five minutes after the
fire started, is that correct?"
Witness: "That's true."
Defense Attorney: "When Mr. Smith told you that, he was still on proba-
tion in state court for armed robbery, wasn't he?"
Witness: "Yes, that's correct."
Defense Attorney: "And isn't it a fact that Mr. Smith's probation does
not expire for another twenty-two months?"
Witness: "That's true."
Defense Attorney: "Detective Hart, you were the arresting officer in the
armed robbery case for which Mr. Smith is now on probation, correct?"
Witness: "Yes, I was."
Defense Attorney: "And you helped him get probation, didn't you?"
Witness: "Yes."
Defense Attorney: "And Mr. Smith has been helping the police by being
an informant-tipster since then, hasn't he?"
Witness: "From time to time, yes."
Defense Attorney: "And you expect that help will continue at least until
his probation is over, don't you?"
Witness: "Yes."
90. FED. R. EvID. 806 (stating that the rule "is not subject to any requirement that the
declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain"); see infra notes 151-
56 and accompanying text (discussing the admission of a declarant's prior inconsistent
statements under Rule 806).
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F Prior Convictions
Evidence of prior convictions is another mode of impeachment avail-
able to the cross-examiner to discredit a witness.91 Rule 609 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence governs impeachment of a witness by evidence of
a prior conviction.92 As stated previously, a court treats a declarant's tes-
timony as that of an in-court witness, therefore, allowing a trial attorney
to impeach the declarant as if he testified in court. 3 Defense counsel can
use evidence of a prior conviction effectively to impeach the credibility of
absent hearsay declarants. 94 Defense counsel may use Rule 806 only with
evidence that a court would admit if the declarant testified in court. 95
Thus, the guidelines of Rule 609 apply strictly when impeaching a declar-
ant with evidence of a prior conviction under Rule 806. This provides
another example of how other Federal Rules of Evidence limit the scope
of Rule 806.96
When a party impeaches a witness with evidence of a prior conviction,
there is no issue about whether the witness testified to a collateral mat-
ter.97 Thus, if a testifying witness denies a prior conviction, the defense
counsel will not be bound by the witness' answer. The defense counsel is
not bound because convictions are generally a matter of public record.98
91. 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1241.
92. FED. R. EVID. 609. Rule 609 provides in part:
(a) ... For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
93. FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note. See also supra notes 6-8 and accom-
panying text.
94. United States v. Bovain, 708 F.2d 606, 613 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 898
(1983). In Bovain, multiple defendants were charged with conspiracy and distribution of
heroin. Id. at 607-08. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the impeachment of a non-testifying
defendant with his prior criminal record during cross-examination of a third party by a
codefendant's counsel. Id. at 613-14. The third party witness testified regarding out-of-
court statements made by one codefendant about another codefendant's role. Id. at 613.
95. United States v. Newman, 849 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1988).
96. See id. (demonstrating that Rule 806 is limited by Rule 609 because Rule 806 can-
not be used unless the prior convictions are admissible under Rule 609).
97. Brannon, supra note 41, at 166-67 (noting that most witnesses will not deny a prior
conviction because they know a public record exists).
98. Id. (stating that if the witness is not truthful about the conviction, the issue is not
collateral).
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The defense counsel will need extrinsic evidence of a prior conviction to
impeach the credibility of a hearsay declarant when the hearsay declarant
cannot be cross-examined about the prior conviction. Defense counsel
may, therefore, resort to extrinsic evidence-a certified copy of a judg-
ment of conviction-to impeach the witness.99
Just as evidence of prior convictions to impeach hearsay declarants
must comply with Rule 609, so must the evidence comply with the provi-
sions of Rule 403.100 Furthermore, before evidence of prior convictions
will be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) to impeach a declarant who is
also the defendant, the trial court must find that the probative value of
the prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect upon the defend-
ant.1 1 However, Rule 609(a)(2) 10 2 requires no such balancing of proba-
tive value against prejudicial effect, because evidence of prior convictions
involving dishonesty or false statements are always probative of
credibility.
10 3
The balancing of probative value versus prejudice is important when
considering the problems that occur when a codefendant is also the de-
clarant whose credibility is vulnerable to attack by evidence of prior con-
victions."° Such problems stem generally from the admission of hearsay
statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), those of a coconspirator who is also
a codefendant. 105 Statements by a coconspirator are impeachable under
99. Id. Judge Brannon notes that the extrinsic evidence available to the attorney to
prove a prior conviction is not without limit. Id. He states that the evidence will be limited
to the most efficient evidence available, namely the certified judgment of conviction. Id.
100. To comply with Rule 403, "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury .... .. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also FED. R. EVID. 806 (stating that the
declarant's credibility may be challenged by any evidence which would be admissible if the
declarant was also a witness).
101. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
102. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (specifying that criminal convictions involving dishonesty
shall be admitted) (emphasis added).
103. See United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1331 (7th Cir) (explaining that convic-
tions involving dishonesty are demonstrative of a witness' ability to testify truthfully), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985). The Court of Appeals clarified that no balancing of probative
value and prejudicial effect is required when the prior conviction falls under 609(a)(2)
because it involved dishonesty or falsehood. Id. The Court of Appeals also added that
crimes such as perjury, fraud, embezzlement, false pretenses, counterfeiting and any other
crime whose commission involves some element of deceit or falsification are 609(a)(2) type
crimes. Id.
104. United States v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 64, 67 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the
admission of prior crimes evidence against a declarant who is also a codefendant corrupts
the notion that defendants are innocent until proven guilty); see also FED. R. EvID. 404(b)
(discussing the admittance of character evidence).
105. Brannon, supra note 41, at 168-69; see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EMERGING
PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 270-71 (David A. Schlueter ed., 2d
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Rule 806 even though Rule 801(d)(2)(E) defines them as non-hearsay.' 0 6
However, admitting evidence of the declarant-codefendant's prior con-
victions creates a danger of compromising the declarant-defendant's pre-
sumption of innocence. 107 Normally defense counsel would impeach a
hearsay declarant with evidence of prior convictions, but when the declar-
ant is a codefendant, this creates a fear that the jury will use the impeach-
ment evidence to improperly decide the guilt or innocence of the
declarant-codefendant before his counsel presents his case-in-chief.'0 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Robinson'09 discussed two ways a trial court can prevent the
declarant-codefendant's presumption of innocence from being compro-
mised by evidence of prior convictions.110 First, the trial court may, in its
discretion, admit the impeaching evidence and give a limiting instruction
informing the jury to use the evidence only to assess the credibility of the
declarant-codefendant, and not to determine guilt, innocence, or the de-
clarant-codefendant's propensity to commit a crime."'
In the second method, the trial court, after weighing the probative
value towards credibility against the prejudicial effect on the declarant-
codefendant and after concluding that the evidence's prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value, may in its discretion, exclude the impeach-
ing evidence of a prior conviction. 1 2 On appeal, this determination will
ed. 1991) (discussing problems of Rule 806 with coconspirator declarants); see also FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (allowing hearsay statements "by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy," if offered against the party).
106. FED. R. EviD. 806. The rule states that when "a statement defined in Rule
801(d)(2),(C),(D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant
may be attacked ... ." Id.
107. Robinson, 783 F.2d at 67.
108. Id. at 67-68.
109. 783 F.2d at 64.
110. Id. at 67-68. In Robinson, the defendant was tried on a conspiracy charge with
multiple codefendants. Id. at 65. The trial court admitted into evidence the out-of-court
declarations of two non-testifying coconspirators. Id. The defendant and two non-testify-
ing coconspirators wanted to impeach each other under Rule 806 with Rule 609 prior
crimes evidence. Id. at 67. The trial court refused to allow any evidence of prior crimes
and the Seventh Circuit upheld this decision. Id. at 68.
111. Id. at 67-68. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides in part: "Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith." FED. R. EVID. 404(b); see also United States v. Bovain,
708 F.2d 606, 613 (11th Cir.) (emphasizing the impeachment value of evidence), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 898 (1983).
112. Robinson, 783 F.2d at 68. The Seventh Circuit stated that by refusing to allow the
impeachment by prior conviction, the judge had been more favorable to the defendants
than if he had allowed the testimony and then given a limiting instruction; this more
favorable treatment is not grounds for reversal. Id.
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not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.' 1 3
However, in dicta the Robinson court stated that where all codefendants
agree that the impeachment value of the prior convictions evidence is
more important than the unfair prejudicial effect on them, the trial court
may admit the evidence.' 14 Thus, defense counsel in multiple defendant
conspiracy cases must be aware of tactical considerations other than those
normally involved in impeaching hearsay declarants.
ILLUSTRATION SIX
IMPEACHMENT OF ABSENT HEARSAY DECLARANT WITH
EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION
Assume the defendant is on trial for a drug conspiracy charge. Special
Agent Elliott Ness has testified on direct as to coconspirators' statements
made to him by Kenny Cokehead while Agent Ness was working in an
undercover capacity. These coconspirators statements implicated the de-
fendant in the drug conspiracy. Assume further that Kenny Cokehead's
trial has been severed from that of the defendant. Cross examination of
Agent Ness proceeds as follows:
Defense Attorney: "Agent Ness, when you talked to Kenny Cokehead,
you claimed he told you he and Isaac Innocent [the defendant on trial]
could supply you with up to three kilos of heroin a week for $30,000.00
per kilo, is that correct?"
Agent Ness: "That's what Mr. Cokehead said."
Defense Attorney: "But yet no drug transactions ever took place after
that conversation, did they?"
Agent Ness: "They were arrested before it got to that point."
113. Id. (applying the abuse of discretion standard).
114. Id. The judge in Robinson did not admit the evidence of prior convictions of the
codefendants even though each wanted to use prior criminal activity for impeachment pur-
poses. Id. at 67-68. The Seventh Circuit did not find abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge and noted that one of the defense attorneys admitted that after impeachment of
each codefendant, the attorneys planned to move for mistrial and/or severance. Id. The
appellate court stated that admission of prior convictions evidence does not automatically
entitle defendants to severance. Id. Otherwise, defendants would have their cake and eat
it too. The defendants would use Federal Rules of Evidence 609 and 806 for impeachment
purposes, then the impeached codefendant would move for a severance based on the al-
leged prejudice from the jury's hearing of his or her prior conviction when the codefendant
was not going to testify at trial and be otherwise subject to cross-examination. This request
for a severance by the codefendant would be joined undoubtedly by the other defendants
who took advantage of Rule 806 in the first place.
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Defense Attorney: "Were you aware when you were speaking to Mr.
Cokehead that he was the same Kenny Cokehead that was convicted of
perjury in federal court in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1992?"
Agent Ness: "No. I was not aware of that."
Defense Attorney: "Your Honor, I now offer as defendant's Exhibit #1 in
evidence a certified copy of the judgment of conviction dated November
5, 1992 showing that Kenny Cokehead was indeed convicted of perjury in
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland."
The Court: "Very well, it will be received as defendant's Exhibit #1, in
evidence."
.G. Prior Bad Acts Probative of Truthfulness
Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the impeach-
ment use of evidence of prior bad acts that are probative of truthful-
ness." 5 Rule 608(b) limits the impeachment of a witness' credibility by
prior bad acts to intrinsic evidence that is probative of truthfulness-that
is, evidence brought out during the in-court witness' testimony. 1 6 The
cross-examiner is bound by the witness' answers and cannot introduce
extrinsic evidence of prior bad acts if the witness denies ever having com-
mitted them.
Because the declarant of a hearsay statement is considered a wit-
ness,117 the out-of-court declarant's credibility should be subject to im-
peachment as if he had testified in court.' 18 Thus, under Rule 608(b),
specific instances of prior bad acts of the declarant may, if probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of
the in-court witness."
9
A test does not exist for determining the probative value of Rule
608(b) impeaching evidence as set forth in Rule 806. Rule 806 only states
115. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) provides in part:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided in
rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired
into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or




117. FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note (noting the fairness of such an
approach).
118. Id. (explaining difficulties of impeaching an out-of-court declarant).
119. FED. R. EvID. 608(b); United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 569-70 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989).
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generally the type of evidence a party may use to undermine hearsay
testimony. °20 In United States v. Friedman,1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit Court set forth a useful standard for de-
termining whether evidence of a declarant's prior bad acts are probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness and, therefore, admissible. The Fried-
man court stated, "[s]pecific issues of whether a declarant's past conduct
may actually 'cast doubt on the credibility of [his] statements'.. . must be
determined by comparing the circumstances of the past conduct with
those surrounding the hearsay statements admitted into evidence.
122
The trial court should determine the probative value of prior bad acts
evidence. The trial court's determination will not be overturned absent a
clear showing of abuse of discretion.
123
Although courts generally limit Rule 608(b) to impeachment by intrin-
sic evidence, some commentary suggests that Rule 806 modifies the appli-
cability of Rule 608(b) and thus allows extrinsic evidence of specific
instances of prior bad acts to impeach the declarant's credibility.' 24 If the
court did not allow the impeaching party to introduce extrinsic evidence
of the declarant's prior bad acts, he or she would be precluded from em-
ploying this type of attack unless the declarant were available to testify in
court. 125 One commentator reasoned that "it is unfair thus to restrict the
attack: The impeaching party ought not to be put to the burden of calling
the declarant to the stand even if he is available, since his adversary has
adduced the statement which gave rise to the need for impeachment.'
' 26
In situations where the declarant has not testified and has not been
subject to cross-examination, extrinsic evidence is the only means of
presenting the impeachment evidence to the trier of fact. 127 Thus, where
120. FED. R. EvID. 806 (providing that credibility of the declarant may be impeached or
supported by any evidence that would have been admissible if the declarant had testified in
court); Friedman, 854 F.2d at 570 & n.8.
121. 854 F.2d at 535.
122. Id. at 570 (quoting United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987)).
123. Id. (citing United States v. Bari, 750 F.2d 1169, 1178 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1019 (1985)).
124. 4 LouISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1241.
125. Id. (reasoning that this would give opposing counsel an unfair advantage).
126. Id.
127. Friedman, 854 F.2d at 570. In Friedman, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's exclusion of evidence of prior bad acts to impeach the declarant of hearsay state-
ments admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) because the prior act
was not probative on the issue of the credibility of the declarant's conspiratorial state-
ments. Id. The declarant's hearsay statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy and
implicated himself. Id. The prior bad act in question was a false statement about an un-
successful suicide attempt. Id. This statement was made under different circumstances-
he tried to shift the blame for his injuries away from himself and on to others. Id.
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the impeaching party can demonstrate that the declarant committed the
prior bad act under similar circumstances as the hearsay statement and is
probative of the declarant's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,
the trial court in its discretion, may admit extrinsic evidence of the prior
bad act to impeach the absent hearsay declarant. Logically, the trial
court should allow the attorney conducting the cross-examination to ask
intrinsically worded questions of the witness on the stand as to whether
he is aware of bad acts, probative of truthfulness, committed allegedly by
the absent hearsay declarant.
ILLUSTRATION SEVEN
IMPEACHMENT OF AN ABSENT HEARSAY DECLARANT BY
PRIOR BAD ACTS RELEVANT TO TRUTHFULNESS
Assume the same facts as in Illustration Six above. The cross-examina-
tion of Agent Ness continues as follows:
Defense Attorney: "Agent Ness, you claimed on direct examination that
Kenny Cokehead told you that my client, Isaac Innocent, was a multi-kilo
distributor of heroin?"
Agent Ness: "Yes, that's what Mr. Cokehead told me."
Defense Attorney: "Were you aware that just two months before you
talked to Mr. Cokehead, he wrote eight bad checks totalling $42,500 on
bank accounts that were closed?"
Agent Ness: "No, I didn't know that."
Defense Attorney: "Were you also aware that Mr. Cokehead signed these
eight bad checks using an alias name, 'Kurt Smith'?"
Agent Ness: "No, I didn't know that either."
H. Prior or Subsequent Inconsistent Statements
Rule 613(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a defense attorney
to impeach the credibility of a witness with evidence of a statement that is
inconsistent with the witness' in-court testimony.12 8 When impeaching an
in-court witness in this manner, counsel may not use extrinsic evidence of
a prior inconsistent statement unless the witness has been given an oppor-
tunity to explain or deny the inconsistency.' 29 This requirement of af-
fording the witness an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency
128. FED. R. EVID. 613(b); see 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1242.
129. FED. R. EvID. 613(b). Rule 613(b) provides in part: "Extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an op-
portunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to
interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require." Id.
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follows the common law rule requiring an attorney to lay a proper foun-
dation before cross-examining the witness.13 ° Federal Rule of Evidence
613(b), however, modifies the common law rule by relaxing the founda-
tional requirement that the witness' attention be directed to the inconsis-
tent statement during the cross-examination. 31  Rule 613(b) provides
only that the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the in-
consistency, without specifying a particular time or sequence in the
trial.
132
Prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts required parties to lay a
foundation for inconsistent statements made by the declarant, despite the
recognized and inherent difficulties in meeting this requirement.133 In
Mattox v. United States, 34 the Supreme Court considered the impeach-
ment of an absent declarant whose statement the trial court admitted as
former testimony. The Court required the impeaching party to lay the
proper foundation before proceeding with the impeachment.'
35
Subsequent to Mattox, some courts began to relax the rigidity of the
foundational requirement for impeachment of hearsay declarants by in-
consistent statements. For example, in Carver v. United States136 the
Supreme Court declined to extend the requirement of a proper founda-
tion to impeachment of dying declarations by inconsistent statements.
137
The Court also stated, "[a]s these declarations are necessarily ex parte, we
think the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any advantage he may
130. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 245 (1895) (noting that "before a witness
can be impeached by proof that he has made statements contradicting or differing from the
testimony given by him upon the stand, a foundation must be laid by interrogating the
witness himself as to whether he has ever made such statements"); 3A WIGMORE, supra
note 6, § 1025, at 1020 (explaining that asking the witness on cross-examination whether he
or she made the statement forecloses any possible objection for unfair surprise).
131. FED. R. EvID. 613 advisory committee's note.
132. FED. R. EvID. 613; see FED. R. EVID. 613 advisory committee's note (explaining
there is no required time or sequence for providing the witness an opportunity to explain
the inconsistent statement).
133. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 248. The Supreme Court noted that other courts are unani-
mous in holding that, "the fact that the attendance of the witness cannot be procured, or
even that the witness himself is dead, does not dispense with the necessity of laying the
proper foundation." Id. In Mattox, the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine
the deceased witness at a former trial. Id. at 250.
134. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
135. Id. at 250 (acknowledging potential hardship, but insisting that this ruling would
prevent perjury).
136. 164 U.S. 694 (1897).
137. Id. at 698. The Court stated, "[w]e are not inclined to extend [the foundational
requirement] to the case of a dying declaration, where the defendant has no opportunity by
cross-examination to show that by reason of mental or physical weakness, or actual hostil-
ity felt toward him, the deceased may have been mistaken." Id.
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have lost by the want of an opportunity for cross-examination. '' 138 Later
decisions of other courts continued this relaxation. 139 The California
Supreme Court in People v. Collup'4 ° noted that "[t]he modern tendency
is to relax rigid rules of evidence-to escape from a slavish adherence to
them with the accompanying hardship, injustice, and prevention of a full
disclosure of all pertinent circumstances to the trier of fact."''
Even under the relaxed foundational standards of Rule 613(b), im-
peaching a hearsay declarant with an inconsistent statement may prove
difficult if a trial court requires the impeaching party to afford the declar-
ant an opportunity to deny or explain the inconsistency. 142 For example,
where the declarant is unavailable, the impeaching party cannot provide
the declarant the opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistent state-
ment.143 This holds true when a court admits the hearsay statement
under the former testimony exception.'" Although the declarant was
available for cross-examination when the former testimony was given,
and could explain or deny a prior inconsistent statement whose existence
is known by the impeaching party, an opportunity does not exist to ex-
plain or deny a prior inconsistent statement discovered after the cross-
examination, or an inconsistent statement made subsequent to the hear-
say statement admitted as former testimony.
45
Thus, Federal Rule of Evidence 806 formally abandons the common
law rule of laying a proper foundation for impeaching hearsay declarants
138. Id. (noting that in this case, the defendant and the deceased were acquainted, and
the circumstances under which death occurred indicated intent other than murder).
139. See, e.g., Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 43 (2d Cir. 1972)
(stating that "since the witness is unavailable it is unnecessary ... to lay a foundation by
first inquiring of the witness whether he made the statements"); People v. Collup, 167 P.2d
714, 717 (Cal. 1946) (stating that "we do not believe that the foundation requirement is
necessary where it is impossible to comply with it due to no fault of the party urging the
impeachment").
140. 167 P.2d 714 (Cal. 1946).
141. Id. at 719 (concluding that the foundation requirement produces harsh results
where laying the foundation becomes impossible).
142. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 806[01], at 806-6 to 807-7 (noting that
the Rule 613 standard cannot always be met).
143. 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1244.
144. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Rule 804(b)(1) provides:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different pro-
ceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same
or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or,
in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
145. FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee note; accord, 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER,
supra note 36, § 501, at 1244; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 806[01], at 806-8.
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with inconsistent statements. 146 Rule 806 provides that evidence of a
statement, inconsistent with the hearsay statement offered for its truth, is
not subject to any requirement that the declarant be given an opportunity
to explain or deny the inconsistency. 147 Otherwise, the impeaching party
would bear an unfair burden in being required to produce the declarant
simply to explain or deny the inconsistency. 148 The party who offered the
hearsay statement is in a better position to call the declarant, and, be-
cause he invoked the hearsay exception, the court should require the
party to present the declarant to elicit the explanation or denial. 149 Many
state court decisions have adopted the Federal Rule's example.1
5 0
The inconsistent statement used to impeach a hearsay declarant under
Rule 806 must be competent, admissible evidence. 5' Second, the trial
judge must determine that the impeaching statement is inconsistent with
the hearsay statement in question. 52 The inconsistent statement, how-
ever, does not have to fall under a hearsay exception to be admissible for
impeachment purposes, but the impeaching party must specify the non-
hearsay purpose for offering the statement. 53 The impeaching party also
must present competent evidence that the witness actually made the in-
consistent statement; hearsay evidence cannot be used as such proof.
154
Once a court admits the inconsistent statement to impeach the declarant's
credibility, the opposing party is entitled to an instruction limiting the
jury's consideration of the inconsistent statement solely for the purpose
of impeachment, unless of course, the declarant made the prior inconsis-
tent statement under oath qualifying it as substantive evidence under
146. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 1 806[01], at 806-6 to 806-7.
147. FED. R. EVID. 806.
148. 4 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1244 (reasoning that it was fair to
burden the party taking advantage of the hearsay exception).
149. Id. (directing counsel to reveal the statement to the opposing attorney).
150. See, e.g., In re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 632 (R.I. 1989) (explaining there is no
requirement under state rule 806 that the witness be made aware of the prior inconsistency
before impeachment); State v. Philpott, 882 S.W.2d 394 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (noting
the state rule "dispenses with the requirement that the declarant have an opportunity to
explain when impeachment is by prior inconsistent statement"); State v. Hall, 329 S.E.2d
860, 864 (W. Va. 1985) (following the Federal Rule of Evidence 806 foundation
requirement).
151. FED. R. EVID. 806. Rule 806 permits impeachment "by any evidence which would
be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness." Id.
152. United States v. Graham, 858 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that statement
purported to be inconsistent, merely cast doubt on whether declarant made them as op-
posed to whether the statements were true), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989).
153. Id.; 4 LOuISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1245.
154. Davis v. State, 791 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (excluding the evidence
as not competent).
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Rule 801(d)(1)(A). 155 The trial judge may exclude the inconsistent state-
ment of the declarant, pursuant to Rule 403, upon a determination that
the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the jury's potential misuse of
the evidence. 56
ILLUSTRATION EIGHT
IMPEACHMENT OF AN ABSENT DECLARANT BY A PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT
Assume the defendant is on trial for conspiracy to possess and receive
stolen goods. The main government witness is Detective Greg Gotcha.
John Jones is an alleged coconspirator of the defendant, Isaac Innocent,
and the prosecution, on direct examination introduces as a cocon-
spirator's statement, evidence that John Jones [the absent hearsay declar-
ant] allegedly told Greg Gotcha [working in an undercover capacity] that
the defendant was the mastermind of the fencing ring. Cross-examina-
tion of Detective Gotcha proceeds as follows:
Defense Attorney: "Detective Gotcha, you claimed on direct examina-
tion that John Jones told you that my client was the mastermind of the
fencing ring, correct?"
Detective Gotcha: "That's what Mr. Jones said."
Defense Attorney: "Are you aware that three months later Mr. Jones
testified, under a grant of immunity, before a federal grand jury in Balti-
more, Maryland?"
Detective Gotcha: "No, I didn't know that."
Defense Attorney: "And are you aware that before that grand jury on
page six, lines fifteen thru seventeen, Mr. Jones testified under oath as
follows: 'Isaac Innocent is a small time fence. The mastermind of the
ring is Ralph Marshall.'"
Detective Gotcha: "I didn't know that."
155. Federal Rule of Evidence 105 provides: "When evidence which is admissible as to
one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose
is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly." FED. R. EVID. 105. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence
801 (d)(1)(A) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ...
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1245-46.
156. FED. R. EvID. 403; 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1246.
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Defense Attorney: "Your Honor, we now move in as defendant's Exhibit
#1, page six of the grand jury testimony of Mr. Jones."
This evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 806 and
801(d)(1)(A) as a subsequent inconsistent statement, and can be consid-
ered by the jury as substantive evidence.
157
The Court: "It will be received as defendant's Exhibit #1, in evidence."
I. Negative Opinion/Reputation Testimony as to Veracity
The ninth mode of impeachment available to the defense attorney is to
attack a testifying witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
with negative opinion or reputation testimony. 158 This mode of impeach-
ment differs from the previous modes because instead of impeaching the
witness through cross-examination, the impeaching party calls his own
witness in his case-in-chief and elicits testimony of a former witness' char-
acter for veracity.' 59 The impeaching testimony must be probative of the
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, rather than of the
witness' general character. 60 If the witness is a layperson, then his or her
opinion must also satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence
701; it must be based on first-hand knowledge, and must be helpful in
resolving a fact in issue.161
157. Evidence that is admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), unlike evidence tendered
under Rule 613, comes in as substantive evidence. It, of course, can also be used to im-
peach the testimony of the absent hearsay declarant.
Obviously when defense counsel seeks to introduce evidence during cross-examination
of a witness in the State's case-in-chief, the defense attorney must obtain a ruling from the
court that by so doing, the defense attorney does not waive his right to make a Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal at the close of the State's case.
158. FED. R. EvID. 608(a). Rule 608(a) provides:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form
of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may
refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of
truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthful-
ness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 608(2); see CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 4 FED-
ERAL EVIDENCE § 511, at 893-94 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing Rule 806 character impeach-
ment of a hearsay declarant).
159. Brannon, supra note 41, at 176 (quoting I. YOUNGER, THE ADVOCATE'S
DESKBOOK: THE ESSENTIALS OF TRYING A CASE § 15.5, at 277 (1988)).
160. FED. R. EvID. 608 advisory committee's note; see also United States v. Cortez, 935
F.2d 135, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1062 (1992).
161. FED. R. EVID. 701. Rule 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear under-
standing of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
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An impeaching party may also attack an absent hearsay declarant's
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness through opinion or reputa-
tion testimony. 162 Trial courts retain discretion in imposing reasonable
limits on impeachment, but "they cannot place an out-of-court witness's
reputation for truthfulness beyond the scope of inquiry. '163 To impeach
the declarant's character for veracity, the impeaching party may question
other witnesses about their opinion of the declarant's character for truth-
fulness or untruthfulness or about the declarant's reputation for truthful-
ness or untruthfulness. 64  The testimony must satisfy the same
requirements of being probative of veracity and based on first-hand
knowledge of the testifying witness, just as if the declarant had testified in
court. 1
65
Id.; see also Cortez, 935 F.2d at 139 (holding that government agents who only knew the
witness in the context of an investigation did not know the witness well enough to offer
opinion testimony on the witness' character for truthfulness).
162. 4 LouISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1241; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 17, 806[01], at 806-12; see also People v. Tai, 547 N.Y.S.2d 989, 993-94 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989) (allowing the admission of negative character evidence to impeach the
character of a non-testifying coconspirator declarant).
163. United States v. Moody, 903 F.2d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit ruled
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees an opportunity for ef-
fective cross-examination, which includes the ability to impeach adversarial witnesses. Id.
The court concluded that the trial court ruling, which had not allowed the defendant to
impeach the reputation for truthfulness of two material declarants, was at odds with the
Confrontation Clause. Id. The court commented in a footnote that "while it is within the
discretionary authority of the trial court to limit cross-examination, that authority 'comes
into play only after there has been permitted as a matter of right sufficient cross-examina-
tion to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.' " Id. at n.7 (quoting United States v. Garza, 754
F.2d 1202, 1206 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Mayer, 556 F.2d 245, 250 (5th Cir.
1977))).
164. E.g., United States v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Lechoco,
the court held that the government attorney could impeach the defendant's character for
veracity through cross-examination of psychiatrists who testified on behalf of the defense
as to the defendant's mental condition. Id. at 88. The defendant's hearsay statements to
the psychiatrists were admitted as statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis, and as
such, the defendant's credibility was open to attack under Rule 806. Id. at 88-89. The
government attorney could, therefore, attack his character for veracity because the testi-
mony of the psychiatrists were based on the assumption that defendant was telling the
truth during the psychiatric interviews. Id.
165. FED. R. EVID. 806 (allowing the impeaching party to present evidence that would
have been admissible had the declarant testified in court).
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ILLUSTRATION NINE
IMPEACHMENT OF AN ABSENT HEARSAY DECLARANT BY
CALLING A NEGATIVE CHARACTER WITNESS FOR
TRUTHFULNESS
Assume the same factual scenario as in the immediately preceding Il-
lustration. After Officer Gotcha testifies and the State rests its case, the
defense attorney calls as his first witness a negative character witness for
truthfulness. This witness is Mary Jones, the mother of the absent hear-
say declarant, John Jones. Direct examination proceeds as follows:
Defense Attorney: "Ms. Jones, do you know John Jones?"
Mary Jones: "Yes, he is my son."
Defense Attorney: "How long have you known John Jones?"
Mary Jones: "Since his birth."
Defense Attorney: "How often do you see your son?"
Mary Jones: "At least once a week."
Defense Attorney: "Do you have a personal opinion as to whether your
son, John Jones, is a truthful person?"
Mary Jones: "Yes, I do."
Defense Attorney: "And what is your opinion, Ms. Jones?"
Mary Jones: "I believe that he is a notorious liar."
Defense Attorney: "Would you believe your son if he testified under
oath?"
Mary Jones: "No. I wouldn't believe a word he says." '166
V. THE PROSECUTION USE OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 806
Just as Rule 806 may prove invaluable to the defense attorney, the rule
is equally valuable and available to the prosecution to impeach hearsay
declarants whose statements have been admitted against the govern-
ment. 1 67 The prosecutor, however, must be aware of possible conflicts
166. Believe it or not, when I served as the Federal Public Defender for the District of
Maryland I called in my case-in-chief the mother of the key government witness and she
testified as a negative character witness for truthfulness of her own son. The jury acquitted
the defendant after deliberating for less than one hour. Thus, as can be seen, a witness
testifying as a negative character witness for truthfulness can be a powerful impeachment
witness. See case file in United States v. Edward J. Audy, Cr. No. Y-80-0253 in the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland-not guilty verdict returned September
23, 1980.
167. State v. Zirkle, No. 03C01-9303-CR-00094, 1995 WL 59483, at *17 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Feb. 13, 1995) (allowing a prosecutor to impeach a declarant under Tennessee Rule
of Evidence 806, which is identical to the federal rule). The Government may also use a
prior consistent statement under Rule 806 to rehabilitate a witness after an attack has been
made on the Government's witness. United States v. Bernal, 719 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir.
1983). Indeed, the Government may attack a declarant's credibility as to some of his state-
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and limitations imposed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.168 The Confrontation
Clause is particularly a stumbling block to the prosecution when the de-
clarant does not testify at trial and is not subject to cross-examination.
169
This situation is governed by Ohio v. Roberts 7 ' and its progeny. The
Supreme Court in Roberts set out a two-prong test for the admissibility of
hearsay evidence presented against the defendant.' 7 ' First, the prosecu-
tor must show that the hearsay evidence is necessary to the government's
case by demonstrating the declarant's unavailability.' 72 Second, the pros-
ecutor must demonstrate the reliability of the hearsay evidence. 173 A
court may infer reliability by showing that the hearsay evidence falls
within an exception rooted firmly in the common law, or by showing the
hearsay evidence's "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
'174
Thus, if hearsay evidence is admissible under the Roberts test, the prose-
cutor may use Rule 806 to impeach the declarant's statement admitted
against the government without violating the Confrontation Clause. 75
Later cases interpreting the Confrontation Clause have limited Roberts
to its facts. 76 In United States v. Inadi,'7 the Supreme Court removed
the unavailability prong for hearsay testimony in the form of cocon-
spirator statements. 178 The prosecution does not need to establish the
unavailability of a coconspirator declarant to introduce hearsay against
the defendant when the statements meet the requirements of Federal
ments and support his credibility as to other statements. United States v. Vegas, 27 F.3d
773, 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 284 (1994).
168. U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." Id. The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974).
169. 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A COMPRE-
HENSIVE REFERENCE TEXT 307 (1989).
170. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
171. Id. at 65; see United States v. Ordonez, 722 F.2d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1983) (following
the two-part test set out in Roberts).
172. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 65-66.
175. FED. R. EvID. 806; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
176. 1 GRAHAM, supra note 169, at 309-13. Roberts concerned the use of hearsay evi-
dence in the form of prior testimony. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
177. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
178. Id. at 394.
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Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).' 79 In Bourjaily v. United States,180 the
Supreme Court further limited Roberts by removing the reliability prong
for the admissibility of out-of-court coconspirator statements.' 81 The
Confrontation Clause does not require the prosecution to establish in-
dependent indicia of reliability before the court will admit the hearsay
statements of non-testifying coconspirators against the defendant. 8 2 The
coconspirator exception is rooted firmly enough in jurisprudence that a
court need not inquire into the reliability of such statements where Rule
801(d)(2)(E) requirements are satisfied.
183
The prosecution may also avoid Confrontation Clause difficulties
where the defendant presents past exculpatory statements, but does not
intend to testify. The prosecutor may impeach the non-testifying declar-
ant, the defendant in this situation, under Rule 806 with prior inconsistent
statements because the defendant has opened the door to his or her
credibility. 184
VI. USE OF RULE 806 TO IMPEACH AN EXPERT'S BASIS OF OPINION
TESTIMONY UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703
Rule 806 normally addresses the credibility of a declarant whose state-
ment is admitted under a hearsay exception or under Rule 801(d)(2)(C),
(D), or (E);185 however, Rule 806 may also extend to Federal Rule of
Evidence 703.186 Theoretically, a party may impeach the basis of an ex-
179. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394. The requirements for admissi-
bility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are: (1) proof of a conspiracy; (2) the declarant must be a
member of the conspiracy; (3) the defendant must be a member of the conspiracy; (4) the
statement was made during the course of the conspiracy; and (5) the statement was made
in furtherance of the conspiracy. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
180. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
181. Id. at 182.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 183-84. In a later case, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized that the hearsay exceptions covering excited utterances and
statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are "firmly rooted"
and therefore carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Id.
at 355-56 & n.8.
184. United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1991).
185. 1 GRAHAM, supra note 169, at 304.
186. FED. R. EvID. 703. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
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pert's opinion, even though not received into evidence for its truth.
187
Nothing in the language of Rule 806 prevents such impeachment and the
principles underlying the rule seem equally applicable.
188
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit recognized the potential use of Rule 806 for impeaching the basis of
an expert's opinion testimony in United States v. Lechoco.189 In dicta, the
court recognized that a jury's determination of the weight given to an
expert's opinion rests, to a great extent, on the reliability of the informa-
tion underlying the expert's opinion. 190 The credibility of the opinion's
basis is an issue and may be impeached.' 9 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also rec-
ognized the use of Rule 806 to impeach the basis of expert testimony.
192
The Fifth Circuit ruled that hearsay evidence disclosing the basis of an
expert opinion should be admissible for impeachment, provided that an
instruction limits the evidence to that purpose, and so long as the evi-
dence has sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. 193 Therefore, if a
party can show the need for the evidence of the basis of the expert's opin-
ion, and show the evidence has some independent indicia of reliability,
then Rule 806 permits the party to introduce evidence impeaching the
credibility of the source of the expert's opinion. 194
VII. SUPPORTING OR REHABILITATING HEARSAY DECLARANTS
In addition to providing for the impeachment of a hearsay declarant's
credibility, Rule 806 also provides for the support or rehabilitation of the
declarant's credibility.' 95 The same evidentiary rules governing both the
admissibility of evidence and the impeachment of a witness' credibility
apply when rehabilitating the credibility of hearsay declarants.' 96
Rehabilitation evidence comes generally in two forms.1 9 7 The first type
of rehabilitation evidence is opinion or reputation testimony of the de-
187. Brannon, supra note 41, at 177 (quoting MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 806.1, at 988 (1986)); see 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17,
703[01], at 703-8 to 703-9 (explaining that under Rule 703 an expert could base his opinion
on inadmissible evidence such as hearsay).
188. 1 GRAHAM, supra note 169, at 304.
189. 542 F.2d 84, 89 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
190. Id. at 86.
191. Brannon, supra note 41, at 177.
192. See Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978).
193. See id. at 545.
194. Id.
195. FED. R. EVID. 806; 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 158, § 511, at 893.
196. FED. R. EVID. 806; 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1253.
197. 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1253.
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clarant's good character for truthfulness.19 s This kind of evidence, how-
ever, is only admissible if the other party has attacked the declarant's
character for truthfulness. 9 For example, in Lechoco,20 0 the prosecutor
discredited the defense psychiatrists during cross-examination which in
turn attacked the defendant's character for truthfulness by questioning
the defendant's truthfulness during his psychiatric examinations.20 1 Thus,
since the prosecutor opened the door, the defense counsel was able to
introduce evidence of the defendant's good character for truthfulness to
support his credibility pursuant to Rule 806.202
The second type of rehabilitation evidence is evidence of another state-
ment by the hearsay declarant consistent with the hearsay statement.
This evidence is admissible if the credibility of the declarant has been
attacked in such a way as to make the consistency relevant to rehabilita-
tion.2 °3 For example, in United States v. Bernal,2° the government intro-
duced an out-of-court statement under the coconspirator exception. The
trial court permitted the government to introduce another statement
made by the declarant, consistent with the statement admitted for its
truth, after the defense attacked the declarant's credibility. 2°5 Thus,
Rule 806 provides the attorney with ample means to support or rehabili-
tate a declarant's credibility either through evidence of good character or
through statements consistent with those admitted for their truth.
VIII. EXAMINING HEARSAY DECLARANTS
Rule 806 permits the party against whom the hearsay has been admit-
ted to call the declarant as a witness and examine him with leading ques-
tions as if under cross-examination.2 °6 Under Rule 806, this type of
examination applies only to declarants whose hearsay statements are ad-
mitted under Rule 803 or 804 or statements admitted in connection with
198. Id.
199. FED. R. EVID. 608(a)(2) (providing that "evidence of truthful character is admissi-
ble only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or
reputation evidence or otherwise").
200. 542 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
201. Id. at 86-87.
202. Id. at 89 n.6.
203. 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1254; see also State v. Lovin, 454
S.E.2d 229, 238 (N.C. 1995) (explaining that it was not prejudicial to exclude prior consis-
tent statement evidence).
204. 719 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983).
205. Id. at 1478-79.
206. FED. R. EVID. 806.
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Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E).2 07 Cross-examination type questioning
does not apply to a party-declarant whose statement is received as a
party-admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or (B). 2°8 This means that
when the party-declarant takes the stand to explain away the statement,
the attorney must conduct the questioning in the direct examination
mode.2 °9 The party may also be unable to question the declarant as if
under cross-examination when the declarant's statements were admitted
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(C) or (D).21° The reason for this limitation is
that the declarant is usually friendly to the party, and therefore willing to
explain away the statement without the necessity of leading questions.
This is generally true unless a party can show that the declarant is a hos-
tile witness.211
IX. CONCLUSION
This article focused on the use of Federal Rule of Evidence 806 to im-
peach absent hearsay declarants, particularly by defense attorneys. The
use of Rule 806 to attack or support an out-of-court declarant's credibility
is an invaluable tool for trial lawyers. Used effectively, Rule 806 enables
the trial lawyer to repair damage to his case from the admission of hear-
say evidence from an absent declarant. The trial lawyer can repair this
damage using Rule 806 to impeach a hearsay declarant with the tradi-
tional modes of impeachment. By allowing the trial attorney to attack
and support hearsay declarants, Rule 806 ensures fairness for the party
against whom the evidence was admitted.
207. 4 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1249 n.14. The Federal Rules of
Evidence do not define Rule 801(d)(2) statements as hearsay, rather they are party admis-
sions and are excluded from the hearsay rules. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
208. 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 158, § 510, at 892 n.4.
209. 4 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 501, at 1249 n.14
210. Id. at 1248-49.
211. Id. at 1249 n.13.
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